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ABSTRACT
Recent studies have shown that modern deep neural network classifiers are easy to fool, assuming
that an adversary is able to slightly modify their inputs. Many papers have proposed adversar-
ial attacks, defenses and methods to measure robustness to such adversarial perturbations. However,
most commonly considered adversarial examples are based on `p-bounded perturbations in the input
space of the neural network, which are unlikely to arise naturally. Recently, especially in computer
vision, researchers discovered “natural” or “semantic” perturbations, such as rotations, changes of
brightness, or more high-level changes, but these perturbations have not yet been systematically uti-
lized to measure the performance of classifiers. In this paper, we propose several metrics to measure
robustness of classifiers to natural adversarial examples, and methods to evaluate them. These met-
rics, called latent space performance metrics, are based on the ability of generative models to capture
probability distributions, and are defined in their latent spaces. On three image classification case
studies, we evaluate the proposed metrics for several classifiers, including ones trained in conven-
tional and robust ways. We find that the latent counterparts of adversarial robustness are associated
with the accuracy of the classifier rather than its conventional adversarial robustness, but the latter
is still reflected on the properties of found latent perturbations. In addition, our novel method of
finding latent adversarial perturbations demonstrates that these perturbations are often perceptually
small.
1 Introduction
Unlike in more conventional software engineering, the problem of ensuring reliability of machine learning (ML)
based software is complicated by the fact that ML-based models, such as artificial neural networks (ANNs), are not
programmed explicitly. Instead, they significantly depend on the data on which they are trained. The traditional form
of assessing model performance based on validation/test data (e.g., a holdout set) and measures such as accuracy
or F-score, become insufficient when the models interact with the real world, such as in the cases of aircraft and
unmanned vehicle control. This is proven by the discovery of adversarial examples [41]—slightly perturbed inputs
that cause ANNs to malfunction, for example by misclassifying an image. For a human, adversarial examples may
be even indistinguishable from original, unperturbed inputs. Adversarial examples are often produced in a rather
artificial environment, by adopting special algorithms that perturb the input until a certain criterion is reached, but
recent evidence [1, 14] suggests that they may transfer to the material world.
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The classic framework of empirical risk minimization (ERM) [43], where the classifier is trained on available data
samples, is used to achieve high values of sample-based metrics such as accuracy or F-score. However, if the classifier
must be protected from adversarial examples, ERM is insufficient, and robust optimization [31] with projected gradient
descent (PGD) can be used instead. This corresponds to enforcing adversarial robustness [3, 5, 12, 24, 27, 33, 38],
which is often treated either as a metric [5, 12, 33] specifying the minimum magnitude of an adversarial perturbation,
or as a specification [3] stating that the decision of the ANN must be invariant to perturbations of input of a certain
form. Adversarial robustness can be local [3, 12, 24, 27, 38] (for a particular input) or global [27] (for all inputs).
Traditional adversarial examples are based on perturbations in the input space of the ANN that are constrained with
`p (e.g., `2 or `∞) norms. The resulting adversarial examples are highly improbable to arise naturally [39], but it was
shown that even natural adversarial examples (i.e., the ones plausible under the data distribution) exist [2, 9, 11, 19, 23,
26, 40, 47]. While conventional adversarial examples often require 2D or 3D printing of precomputed images [1] to be
applied in the real world, a natural adversary could be seen as a manipulator of semantic features of classified objects.
Construction of a subclass [2, 26, 40, 47] of such examples is possible with the help of generative models, such as
generative adversarial networks (GANs) [17] and generative autoencoders [32]. Previous works that considered natural
adversarial examples mostly focused on attacks (e.g., [26, 47]) and defenses (e.g., [26, 36, 39]) rather than assessing
the performance of classifiers. Natural adversarial examples were also applied for ANN training [26], although the
focus so far has been on adversarial robustness in the input space of the ANN.
This paper utilizes generative models as a means of capturing real-world data distributions in order to move closer
to formalizing and checking the original, natural language specification: “the ANN shall classify the input to class c
whenever the input belongs to class c.” Towards this end, our paper studies how to specify and evaluate performance
metrics for ANN classifiers in terms of probabilities, likelihood and distances in latent spaces of generative models.
As a result, our metrics capture the robustness of classifiers to natural adversarial examples, and thresholds on these
metrics may correspond to the desired specifications. The contributions of the paper are as follows:
1. We propose a framework to evaluate the performance of feed-forward deep ANN classifiers with the help of
generative models and their latent spaces. The implementation of the framework is publicly available online.
2. Within this framework, we propose latent space performance metrics—novel performance metrics for feed-
forward ANN classifiers that are grounded on probabilistic reasoning in latent spaces of generative models,
and, informally speaking, measure the “resistance” of the classifier to natural adversarial examples [26, 40,
47]. The naturality of adversarial examples is achieved by (1) operating in the latent space of the generative
model, (2) considering a distribution-preserving model of noise, and (3) generating adversarial examples by
adding random noise, or by searching for worst-case examples that are bounded by the likelihood of noise.
3. We propose methods to approximately evaluate these metrics in a white-box setting using (1) sampling and
(2) gradient-based search of adversarial perturbations in the latent space. The latter method is a form of
untargeted attack based on PGD. We show that such a search is possible not only with GANs [47], but also
with generative autoencoders.
4. For each of three considered image classification case studies, we examine five classifiers trained traditionally
and in a way that achieves adversarial robustness, and evaluate their performance according to latent space
performance metrics. Our PGD-based untargeted attack is able to find perceptually smaller latent perturba-
tions than reported earlier [47], and we find positive association between latent counterparts of adversarial
robustness and the accuracy of a classifier on clean images. What is more, this association is absent for latent
space performance metrics and conventional adversarial robustness, but instead the latter leads to minimum
latent adversarial perturbations being further from the original image in the original (non-latent) space as well
as perceptually.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents background material. Section 3 motivates the use
of generative models to measure ANN classifier performance, and proposes corresponding metrics. In Section 4,
approaches are given to evaluate these metrics. Evaluation of deep convolutional neural network (CNN) classifiers
with these approaches is performed in Section 5. Section 6 reviews related work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Artificial neural networks
A feed-forward artificial neural network (ANN) N is a parametric model that predicts some outcome y (a single
number or a vector) based on some input vector x of dimension nI . By feed-forward, we mean that the input is supplied
to the network at once and is passed through a predefined computation graph with a finite number of computation
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nodes. When the input is an image,N is usually a convolutional neural network (CNN). In this paper, we focus on the
classification task, whereN must assign its input to one of m > 1 classes. Thus, we haveN : RnI → {1, ...,m}. We
assume that class prediction is done as follows: N first produces real-valued scores of each class i, to which we will
refer as the values of the scoring function SN (x, i), and the actually predicted class is the one with the maximum score:
N (x) = arg maxi SN (x, i). In addition, we require that SN (x, i) is continuous and almost everywhere differentiable
with respect to x.
ANN classifiers are typically trained in a supervised way with some form of gradient descent (e.g., stochastic gra-
dient descent), using samples x1, ..., xk ∈ RnI , which are paired with respective reference class labels y1, ..., yk ∈
{1, ...,m}. These pairs (x1, y1), ..., (xk, yk) are assumed to come from joint distribution Djoint, whose marginals are
input data distribution D and the class label distribution Dlabels.
2.2 Generative models
A generative adversarial network (GAN) [17], which consists of two feed-forward ANNs called the discriminator
and the generator G, is trained to make G generate elements of some target data distribution D of nI -dimensional
vectors (in the simplest case, without sample labels). Data generation is done by applying G to a low-dimensional
vector l ∈ RnL sampled from the latent code distribution DL (typically, N(0, I)). If l ∼ DL, then for a well-
trained GAN we may assume that G(l) ∼ D. Often, the dimension of DL is made smaller than the dimension of D:
nL < nI . The set of all latent codes (usually, just RnL ) is called the latent space. By contrast, we will refer to the
input space of an ANN classifier (RnI ) as the original space. With some enhancements, GANs may be also capable
of reconstruction—finding latent representation l ∈ RnL for the given original vector x ∈ RnI such that G(l) is close
to x (e.g., according to some norm in the original space). For example, this may be done by training an additional
ANN I : RnI → RnL called an inverter [23]. However, obtaining good inversions, especially for GANs that generate
high-resolution images, requires more effort: for example, in [6], inversion is performed layer-wise and combined
with gradient-based optimization.
An autoencoder (NE ,ND), where NE and ND are feed-forward ANNs called the encoder and the decoder respec-
tively, is a model whose goal is to compress (encode) its inputs x ∈ RnI to low-dimensional vectors l = NE (x) ∈
RnL (again, nL < nI ) such that approximate decompression (decoding, reconstruction) can be achieved: ND (l) is
close to x. A generative autoencoder (such as in [21, 32]) is an autoencoder whose decoder is additionally trained
to sample from the original distribution D—thus, essentially, a generative autoencoder performs both the tasks of an
autoencoder and a GAN. For a well-trained generative autoencoder, we may assume both l ∼ DL ⇒ ND(l) ∼ D and
x ∼ D ⇒ NE(x) ∼ DL.
To summarize, generative models are capable of data generation from low-dimensional vectors. By using special types
of generative models or enhancing existing generative models, it is also possible to achieve data reconstruction.
2.3 Adversarial examples and perturbations
Suppose that N is an ANN classifier. An adversarial example is an input x′ to N such that x′ ∈ A(x) and N (x′) 6=
N (x), where x is a real data sample, A(x) is the set of allowed changes of x (often, it is taken as the ε-ball around x
according to the `p norm: A(x) = {x′ | ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ ε}). ∆x = x′−x is the corresponding adversarial perturbation.
Adversarial examples and adversarial perturbations have been first found to exist in [8, 15], but became more known
from the work [41], where human-indistinguishable ImageNet perturbations were presented. Since 2013, many [1]
adversarial attacks and defenses have been proposed. While many proposed defenses were shown to be ineffective [14],
attacks were transported to the real world [1], raising concerns regarding the safety and security of deep ANNs.
For adversarial perturbations bounded with `2 and `∞ norms, projected gradient descent (PGD) has been shown [31] to
be the best adversary that has access only to∇xSN (x, ·). The most common method of defense is robust optimization
with PGD, where training is done on adversarial examples for the current version of the ANN. In [13], it was shown
that it is possible to train the classifier on samples with added visible Gaussian noise instead of specially crafted
adversarial examples.
Recent works explain adversarial examples through the peculiarities of the multidimensional geometry [13] and the
fact that conventional ERM-based training does not introduce human priors to the training process [25]. It has been
also hypothesized [36, 39] that adversarial examples do not lie on the data manifold of the training distribution, but
several works show that even natural adversarial examples exist, such as the ones that come from the real world [23],
are made by rotations and translations [11], color distortions [19], semantic changes [9], looping over consequent
video frames [19], and created with generative models [2, 26, 40, 47]. Latent space adversarial examples, or adver-
sarial examples that correspond to some latent codes of a generative model, may be based on perturbations [2, 47] or
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generated from scratch [40]. It was shown [26] that latent space adversarial examples can be used to enhance robust
optimization and increase the overall robustness of the classifier.
2.4 Performance metrics for adversarial robustness
Often, the set of possible adversarial examples is defined locally for each input x—for example, as an `p ε-ball, or as
a set of rotations of x [11]. The robustness of the classifier is then measured as its accuracy on worst-case inputs taken
from such sets. In [5], for the `∞ norm, this metric was formalized as adversarial frequency. Adversarial frequency,
however, depends on ε. A different way to measure robustness, which is free from this hyperparameter, is adversarial
severity [5]—the expected (with x ∼ D) minimum distance from x to an adversarial example. The corresponding local
metric is pointwise robustness, which is the minimum distance to an adversarial example for a particular x. In this
paper, we will define metrics that are based on pointwise robustness, adversarial frequency and severity but operate
with different norms in different spaces. Known metrics that are defined in the original space will be referred to as
conventional metrics.
3 Latent space performance metrics
In this paper, we are interested in specifying and evaluating performance metrics for ANN classifiers with the help
of generative models. In addition, we would like to evaluate these metrics given the original training and validation
data. This section will propose several such latent space performance metrics, and methods to evaluate them will be
proposed in Section 4.
3.1 Preliminary definitions
Suppose that N : RnI → {1, ...,m}, m > 1, is a feed-forward ANN classifier with scoring function SN . The goal of
N is to correctly classify input vectors drawn from distribution D. In the most general case, there may be no unique
correct label for an input vector, but rather there is a joint distribution Djoint of pairs (x, y) of an input vector x and
its label y. For simplicity, we assume that N is validated on samples drawn exactly from Djoint, although the training
might have been performed on a distribution induced by data augmentation of input vectors x.
Suppose that DiL, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are nL-dimensional (nL < nI ) class-conditional latent distributions (often assumed
to be N(0, I)) such that we have trained transformations Di that generate samples from class-conditional data distri-
butions Di: l ∼ DiL ⇒ Di(l) ∼ Di. In certain cases (see models capable of reconstruction in Section 2.2), we may
additionally have transformations Ei that return latent code approximations of nI -dimensional vectors. We would
like Di to be compatible with gradient descent, i.e., continuous and almost everywhere differentiable, but we do not
require the same from Ei.
3.2 Motivation for latent space performance metrics
With both Di and Ei, we can convert vectors to the latent space and back. Assuming that the latent space corresponds
to a well-trained generative model, working in it has the following benefits compared to the original space:
1. For a random latent vector l ∼ DiL, Di(l) is often plausible according to D.
2. Changes of the vector in the latent space are semantic (high-level) in terms of the original representation.
3. For each class i, the image Di(RnL) contains an infinite number of diverse data samples, which may be
useful for evaluation and further training of N .
4. The aforementioned samples can not only be generated at random, but also can be optimized with gradient-
based techniques to optimize a certain objective (e.g., SN ).
As many performance metrics, such as accuracy, adversarial frequency and severity, will remain meaningful when the
original space is replaced with the latent one, the main approach of introducing latent performance metrics used in this
paper is moving conventional performance metrics to the latent space. We will do it in a way that provides additional
benefits related to the probabilistic interpretation of the latent space—for example, while considering adversarial
perturbations, we will take care that the data remains plausible according to D.
3.3 Possible scenarios
Intuitively, sampling from DiL gives latent vectors l such that Di(l) are instances of class i. Previous works on natural
adversarial examples obtained latent vectors based on generation [40] and reconstruction [47]. These two scenarios of
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Figure 1: Overview of considered scenarios.
obtaining Di(l) (see the upper part of Fig. 1, paths 1a and 1b) directly correspond to two operations that generative
models are capable of (see Section 2.4):
1. sample l ∼ DiL and generate x = Di(l);
2. take a random real sample xˆ ∼ Di, encode it as l = Ei(xˆ), and reconstruct it as x = Di(l).
In this paper, we are interested in finding latent space counterparts for the following metrics (each of them will
correspond to one of three scenarios in the lower part of Fig. 1):
1. Accuracy, as well as similar metrics based on counting success frequencies (Fig. 1, path 2a). This is the
simplest case: it is sufficient to calculate the success frequency of N on reconstructed or generated samples.
This will be formalized in Section 3.4.
2. Corruption robustness to random noise [13, 22] (Fig. 1, path 2b). While in the original space the addition
of noise is a form of data corruption, in the latent space this noise will introduce semantic changes to the input,
and we could measure the success frequency of N on such semantically modified inputs. In Section 3.5, we
will introduce a family of noise-adding distributions N,l that retain the transformed data plausible even for
large noise, and define a corresponding performance metric.
3. Adversarial robustness [3, 12, 24, 27, 38] (Fig. 1, path 2c). Adversarial robustness in the latent space
can be treated as “resistance” to worst-case noise additions that are bounded according to noise likelihood
and optimized to degrade the performance of N . The connection between noise corruption robustness and
adversarial robustness exists already in the original space: for example, if the noise is Gaussian, its likelihood
is determined by its `2 norm, a threshold on which is a common constraint on adversarial perturbations.
What is more, noise corruption robustness and adversarial robustness were found to be highly related [13].
The corresponding latent space metrics will be formalized in Section 3.6.
3.4 Accuracy in the latent space
Probably the simplest thing that can be done with generative models is to evaluate the accuracy of the classifier on
generated and reconstructed data items. This situation corresponds to the absence of any adversary. These ideas are
formalized in the following definitions:
Definition 1 (latent generation accuracy) the latent generation accuracy (LGA) of N is:
LGA(N ) def= Pi∼Dlabels, l∼DiL (N (Di(l)) = i) .
Definition 2 (latent reconstruction accuracy) the latent reconstruction accuracy (LRA) of N is:
LRA(N ) def= P(x,i)∼Djoint (N (Di(Ei(x))) = i) .
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In LGA, which requires Di but not Ei, compared to regular accuracy on the holdout set, we have replaced real data
samples with generated samples, following class probabilities in Djoint (also note that it is possible to consider similar
metrics for each class separately). As a result, an unlimited number of samples can be used to estimate LGA. In
addition, misclassified samples found during the check of this specification can be used to train N further. In LRA,
instead of generating new samples, we take the approximations of real ones computed with both Di and Ei. This
resembles the Defense-GAN [36] approach.
While LGA can be measured by sampling latent codes, LRA can be estimated based on samples from the holdout set
(see Section 4.2). The main purpose of LGA and LRA in this paper is to serve as baselines for other metrics proposed
in the following subsections, which, in addition to generation or reconstruction, assume the presence of an adversary.
3.5 Noise corruption robustness in the latent space
In this subsection, we consider a randomized noise-adding adversary. Suppose that N,l is some noise-adding distri-
bution that operates on latent vectors l, where parameter  ≥ 0 controls the magnitude of the noise. Below, we will
use the same notation for the probability density function (PDF) of this distribution. We would like the following
conditions to be satisfied:
1. Distribution preservation: for all , sampling l′ ∼ N,l with l ∼ DiL is equivalent to sampling l′ ∼ DiL.
This condition ensures the “naturality” of noise: its addition does not shift the distribution of input vectors,
meaning that it will not produce vectors that are not plausible according to DiL (compared, e.g., with addition
of noise to each component of the original data item).
2. Support of small noise: if → 0, random vectors X ∼ N,l converge (e.g., in probability) to X ≡ l, i.e., the
added noise becomes negligible. This condition ensures that small  corresponds to small noise.
3. Support of large noise: if  → +∞, random vectors X ∼ N,l converge (e.g., in probability) to X ∼ DiL,
i.e., the unperturbed latent vector l becomes irrelevant. This condition ensures that large  corresponds to
large noise. Convergence to DiL is needed to comply with the first condition.
We will propose a concrete family of distributions satisfying these properties in Section 4.3. Now, we look at the case
where the input to be classified is a perturbed version of the reconstruction of a real data element:
Definition 3 (local latent noise accuracy) the local latent noise accuracy (LLNA) of N in point x ∈ RnI of known
class i with noise magnitude  is:
LLNA(N , , x, i) def= Pl∼N,Ei(x) (N (Di(l)) = i) .
LLNA is similar to LRA, except that checks are performed on noisy reconstructions of a fixed real data sample x.
LLNA can be evaluated based on sampling noise vectors (see Section 4.3).
3.6 Adversarial robustness in the latent space
Next, instead of checking the classifier’s resistance to random noise, we consider perturbations chosen by an adversary.
In terms of N,l, we can assume that the adversary can choose the worst case input within bounded likelihood. Given
fixed x and i, l′ = N,Ei(x) is a random nL-dimensional vector. Then:
Definition 4 (local latent adversarial robustness) the local latent adversarial robustness (LLAR) of N in point x ∈
RnI with known class i, with noise magnitude , is:
LLAR(N , , Ei(x), i) def= max{τ | ∀l′ ∈ RnL : (N,Ei(x)(l′) ≥ τ ⇒ N (Di(l′)) = i)}.
This defines LLAR as the maximum likelihood τ of a latent adversarial perturbation and, with low LLAR corre-
sponding to high robustness. LLAR captures proximity in the latent space and is similar to known definitions of local
robustness checked in the input space of the ANN [3, 5, 12, 24, 27, 38], for example, to pointwise robustness [5].
However, the likelihood τ of a multivariate random vector may be inconvenient to operate with, and thus we allow it to
be post-processed with some decreasing function g(τ). In Section 4.7, we will propose an approach that views LLAR
as `2 robustness in the latent space (i.e., g will convert the likelihood to this norm) and either finds its approximate
value or checks whether it is above a given threshold.
Next, we transform LLAR to global performance metrics, returning to the ideas of sampling latent vectors and looping
through reconstructed data items:
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Definition 5 (latent adversarial generation severity) the latent adversarial generation severity (LAGS) of N with
noise magnitude  is:
LAGS(N , g, ) def= Ei∼Dlabels, l∼DiLg(LLAR(N , , l, i)).
Definition 6 (latent adversarial reconstruction severity) the latent adversarial reconstruction severity (LARS) ofN
with noise magnitude  is:
LARS(N , g, ) def= E(x,i)∼Djointg(LLAR(N , , Ei(x), i)).
Definition 7 (latent adversarial generation accuracy) the latent adversarial generation accuracy (LAGA) ofN with
noise magnitude  and bound ρ on its transformed likelihood is:
LAGA(N , g, ρ, ) def= Pi∼Dlabels, l∼DiL (g(LLAR(N , , l, i)) > ρ) .
Definition 8 (latent adversarial reconstruction accuracy) the latent adversarial reconstruction accuracy (LARA)
of N with noise magnitude  and bound ρ on its transformed likelihood is:
LARA(N , g, ρ, ) def= P(x,i)∼Djoint (g(LLAR(N , , Ei(x), i)) > ρ) .
LAGS and LARS are similar to adversarial severity as defined in [5], and LAGA and LARA are similar to adversarial
frequency [5]. Intuitively, LAGS and LARS are average LLAR values, while LAGA and LARA measure average
success rate of passing a specification of being resistant to sufficiently likely latent perturbations. In Section 4.7, we
will approximately evaluate all these metrics with sampling and PGD. The overview of all considered latent space
performance metrics is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Overview of the proposed latent space performance metrics.
Metric Abbreviation Needs Ei Adversary Value range
Latent generation accuracy LGA No No [0, 1]
Latent reconstruction accuracy LRA Yes No [0, 1]
Local latent noise accuracy LLNA Yes Random noise [0, 1]
Local latent adversarial robustness LLAR Yes PGD R+
Latent adversarial generation accuracy LAGA No PGD [0, 1]
Latent adversarial generation severity LAGS No PGD Ra
Latent adversarial reconstruction accuracy LARA Yes PGD [0, 1]
Latent adversarial reconstruction severity LARS Yes PGD Ra
a May be more restricted depending on the choice of g.
4 Evaluating latent space performance metrics
This section proposes concrete approaches to calculate the values of the metrics defined in Section 3. The general idea
is to work with the standard multivariate Gaussian distribution as the latent one due to its well-known properties. This
is especially important for addressing latent adversarial robustness in Section 4.7.
4.1 Choice of generative models
To be able to work with probability densities in the latent spaces DiL, we need to fix the selection of these spaces. We
achieve this by taking DiL = N(0, I). Then, to evaluate all metrics proposed in Section 3, transformations Di and, for
reconstruction-based metrics, Ei must be defined for all classes 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The following techniques can be applied:
1. For each i, train a generative autoencoder (NEi ,NDi ) and take Ei(x) def= NEi (x), Di(l) def= NDi (l).
2. For each i, train a GAN with generator Gi and take Ei(x) def= Gi(x). Di can be obtained by enhancing these
GANs with encoding procedures, e.g., by training inverters [23], performing gradient-based optimization of
latent codes, or both [6]. Instead of training models for each class separately, it is possible to train class-
conditional models [34].
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4.2 Measuring latent accuracy
With Di and Ei defined, LGA can be measured by repeatedly sampling a class label i ∼ Dlabels and a latent code
l ∼ N(0, I), calculating og = [N (Di(l)) = i],1 which is a Bernoulli random variable, and averaging the obtained
values of og , which gives an unbiased estimate of LGA. Similarly, LRA can be measured by sampling validation data
items (x, i) and averaging or = [N (Di(Ei(x)) = i].
4.3 Noise model and measuring local latent noise accuracy
Suppose that we sample (x, i) ∼ Djoint by enumerating over (x1, y1), ..., (xk, yk). In this case l = Ei(x) ∼ N(0, I).
At this point, we can inject a random perturbation into the latent code. We define the noise-adding distribution N,l in
the following way:
l′ ∼ N,l def⇔ l′ = l +  · δl√
1 + 2
with δl ∼ N(0, I). (1)
Note that, given the previous choice DiL = N(0, I), this choice of N,l complies with the constraints stated in Sec-
tion 3.2, and it would not be distribution-preserving either (1) with a non-Gaussian δl, or (2) without the denominator√
1 + 2. Furthermore, the definition (1) is equivalent to:
N,l = N
(
l√
1 + 2
,
2
1 + 2
I
)
. (2)
LLNA can be measured as follows: find the latent vector l = Ei(x), then repeatedly sample l′ ∼ N,l and calculate
on = [N (l′) = i], which is again a Bernoulli random variable. The rest is similar to checking LGA and LRA.
4.4 Likelihood of perturbations and perturbed vectors
In the rest of this section, to check LLAR and its derivatives, we will optimize latent perturbations—adversarially cho-
sen perturbations that are bounded by the likelihood of the outcomes of N,l. They are similar to the ones considered
in [47]. Noise addition N,l (2) can be interpreted as a composition of two transformations:
1. decay (reduction) of the unperturbed latent vector l by
√
1 + 2;
2. addition of Gaussian noise ∆l ∼ N (0, 2I/(1 + 2)).
Below, we will refer to ∆l as a latent adversarial perturbation rather than noise, emphasizing that ∆l will be produced
with directed search rather than sampling. What perturbations ∆l are more likely? The log-likelihood of ∆l having a
standard Gaussian distribution is determined by the `2 norm of ∆l:
log fN(0,2I/(1+2))(∆l) = log
nL∏
j=1
√
1 + 2
2pi2
exp
(
−1 + 
2
22
∆l2j
)
= nL log
√
1 + 2
2pi2
− 1 + 
2
22
nL∑
j=1
∆l2j = c1()− c2() ‖∆l‖22 . (3)
The distribution of the perturbed vector l′ = l/
√
1 + 2 + ∆l, which is of interest in the definition of LLAR, differs
from the one of ∆l only by its mean, and thus its log-likelihood as a function of ∆l is the same.
4.5 Optimization problem for bounded latent perturbation search
To measure LAGA and LARA (Section 3.6), it is sufficient to check whether LLAR at the current latent point is
bounded with a defined likelihood τ (according to the noise model from Section 4.3): that is, any perturbation whose
likelihood is at least τ , is class-preserving. According to Eq. 3, each positive value τ uniquely corresponds to a par-
ticular value of the `2 norm of the perturbation ∆l around l/
√
1 + 2. For convenience, we will measure perturbation
likelihood with its scaled norm ‖·‖s2 = ‖·‖2 /
√
nL. With this scaling, the expected squared scaled norm of a multidi-
mensional vector distributed according to N(0, I) is one. The following function transforms the likelihood of ∆l to
1[x] (Iverson bracket) is 1 if x is true, and 0 if x is false.
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‖∆l‖s2:
g(τ) =
√
c1()− log τ
nL · c2() .
We also introduce the following auxiliary definitions:
• l0 is the initial latent vector, where a LLAR specification should be checked. It corresponds to some input
vector x with its available label i: l0 = Ei(x).
• The decay factor d = 1 − 1/√1 + 2 (0 ≤ d ≤ 1) is the amount of reducing the vector l prior to the search
of a perturbation.
• l1 = (1− d)l0 = l0/
√
1 + 2 is the reduced vector, which is the mean of the perturbation ∆l.
Thus, we need to check whether there is an adversarial perturbation ∆l with ‖∆l‖s2 ≤ ρ, where ρ = g(τ), that makes
the classifier N classify Di(l1 + ∆l) as not belonging to class i. Suppose that an objective function O : RnL → R is
available such that O(∆l) > 0 implies correct classification and O(∆l) < 0 implies misclassification. We take
O(∆l) = s(i)− max
1≤j≤m,j 6=i
s(j), where s(j) = SN (Di(l1 + ∆l), j).
It is almost everywhere differentiable due to the corresponding assumptions on SN and Di. Then we can solve the
following constrained optimization problem with gradient-based techniques:
minimize
∆l: ‖∆l‖s2≤ρ
O(∆l). (4)
4.6 Intuition for non-zero decay factor
At first glance, viewing latent perturbations as a perturbation of l1 but not l0 (which equals l1 only in the case of
zero noise) may be confusing. The intuitive explanation, on the other hand, is in line with the purpose of division
by
√
1 + 2 in (1), which is needed to reduce the covariance matrix of the distribution of perturbed vectors (with
unperturbed vectors l ∼ N(0, I)) back to I . Decay moves the search region to the area of more likely (having a
smaller norm) vectors. Again, we remind that the likelihood in DiL in the general case does not correspond to the
likelihood in Di. Still, in our experiments, decay moves latent vectors towards “averaged” representatives of each
class.
4.7 Latent perturbation search with PGD
The constrained problem (4), considered for an approximationEy(x) of a data element (x, y), corresponds to checking
a threshold specification on LLAR. Our proposed untargeted attack that solves this problem is a variant of PGD [31].
PGD is started from a random latent perturbation within the allowed ρ-ball and is run until a misclassification is
achieved, i.e., O(∆l) < 0, but no longer than for a predetermined number of steps. The learning rate is set to ensure
that the boundary of the ρ-ball can be reached from any point inside it. To avoid exploding or vanishing gradients, as
in [31], we scale g = ∇O(∆l) with its `2 norm (specifically, we divide g by ‖g‖s2). The optimization procedure is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Next, we consider evaluation of performance metrics that are based on LLAR. Evaluation of LAGA and LARA is
similar to the one of LGA and LRA, except that a generated or approximated point is altered by the PGD adversary. To
increase reliability, PGD should be run multiple times. To evaluate LAGS and LARS, minimum perturbation bounds
ρ need to be calculated and averaged. To approximately find the minimum norm ρ of a class-changing perturbation
without pre-setting it, we apply the following techniques:
• Set ρ to a large value (we use ρ = 2.5) and start PGD with a small learning rate at ∆l = 0. It will reach some
solution, whose norm could be used as an approximation for minimum ρ.
• The solution above might be prone to reaching local optima, which can be mitigated by several restarts from
different points. In this case, to enforce norm minimization, each new restart is done with ρ set to the scaled
norm of the previously found solution, and the learning rate is reduced proportionally to the shrinkage of ρ.
To evaluate LAGS and LARS, we also explored the use of DeepFool [33], which is an algorithm to find minimum
`p adversarial perturbations. Essentially, it is a variant of gradient descent with specifically chosen step magnitudes
that are intended for fast convergence to a perturbation lying on the decision boundary of the classifier. Unfortunately,
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Figure 2: Graphical interpretation of latent perturbation search with PGD. The grey circle is the region where the
adversarial perturbation ∆l is searched, and l is the current candidate solution.
we observed its frequent divergence on our optimization problem (in [33], images were manipulated in the original
space). Gradient clipping resumed convergence, although it often cannot be achieved in just a few steps as in [33].
Thus, for the lack of apparent benefits of using DeepFool, in our experiments we apply only PGD.
5 Experimental evaluation
5.1 Implementation and experimental setup
The proposed framework of evaluating feed-forward ANN classifier performance with generative models was imple-
mented in Python with pytorch. The code and models used to obtain the results described in this section are publicly
available at https://github.com/igor-buzhinsky/latent-space-nn-evaluation. As the case studies, we
considered the following image classification problems:
1. MNIST [29] digit classification (m = 10 classes). As generative models, for MNIST, we trained a WGAN [4]
with nL = 64 for each class, and implemented Ei with gradient descent (Adam with 4 restarts) over latent
codes. Examples of images reconstructed and generated by these models are given in Fig. A.1 (top).
2. Gender predictions based on face photos, using the CelebA [30] dataset (m = 2 classes: 1 = “female”, 2 =
“male”; images were center-cropped and resized to 128×128 pixels). For CelebA, we trained PIONEER [20,
21] generative autoencoders for each dataset and class with nL = 511. Examples of images produced by the
models are given in Fig. A.1 (middle)—note that the visual quality of reconstructed images is somewhat
better compared to generated images.
3. Scene type prediction using the LSUN [46] dataset (m = 2 classes: 1 = “bedroom”, 2 = “church outdoor”;
images were center-cropped and resized to 128 × 128 pixels). For LSUN scene types, we also trained PIO-
NEER models with nL = 511. However, as seen from Fig. A.1 (bottom), except for bedroom reconstructions,
the visual quality of images produced by PIONEER models for LSUN is worse compared to CelebA images.
For each of these classification problems, we trained five deep CNN classifiers (see Appendix B for details):
1. NUT (“undertrained”): a classifier trained in a usual way, without data augmentation, but only for one epoch
(to intentionally achieve lower accuracy);
2. NNR (“non-robust”): the same as above, but trained only several epochs;
3. NCA (“conventional augmentation”): a classifier trained in a usual way, with conventional data augmentation;
4. NR (“robust”): a classifier trained on images corrupted with visible Gaussian noise [13];2
5. NB (“both”): a classifier trained with both conventional data augmentation and noise corruption.
2This form of training was used instead of more common robust optimization with PGD to reduce computation time.
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5.2 Performance evaluation using original space metrics
The performance metrics of the above deep CNN classifiers in the original space are reported in Table 2. From this
table, it is visible that, as expected, training with Gaussian noise achieved not only noise corruption robustness but
also adversarial robustness, and the latter two are associated. In addition, a trade-off is visible between the accuracy
of the classifiers on clean images (hereinafter, clean accuracy) and adversarial robustness, which is in agreement with
previous observations [42].
Table 2: Performance metrics of considered CNN classifiers measured in the original space. Accuracy was measured
on the validation set of each dataset. For noise accuracy, we report accuracy on images corrupted with standard
Gaussian noise with σ = 0.8. Adversarial severity [5] is reported for `2 and `∞ norms scaled by dividing by
√
nI and
nI respectively. It was estimated on 600 images per classifier. Adversarial perturbations were searched with PGD: for
each image, 15 runs were performed with norm threshold shrinkage as explained at the end of Section 4.7, except for
doing this in the original space. For each PGD run, we used 50 steps of magnitude 0.05ρ from a random point, where
ρ is the current norm threshold. For each value series, the best (largest) value is shown in bold.
Dataset Classifier
Accuracy Adversarial severity
Clean Noise ‖∆x‖ = ‖∆x‖s2 ‖∆x‖ = ‖∆x‖∞ / nI
MNIST
NUT 98.2% 86.7% 0.0919 0.2094
NNR 99.2% 86.1% 0.0892 0.1848
NCA 98.7% 93.9% 0.1124 0.2754
NR 99.1% 98.5% 0.1702 0.5018
NB 98.3% 97.7% 0.1687 0.4921
CelebA
NUT 95.0% 82.7% 0.0037 0.0094
NNR 97.5% 77.5% 0.0041 0.0099
NCA 96.5% 48.2% 0.0033 0.0090
NR 96.8% 95.9% 0.0143 0.0354
NB 94.7% 94.0% 0.0135 0.0344
LSUN
NUT 94.3% 74.3% 0.0025 0.0061
NNR 98.0% 50.7% 0.0031 0.0071
NCA 97.5% 51.5% 0.0051 0.0107
NR 93.5% 95.8% 0.0167 0.0346
NB 95.0% 96.1% 0.0192 0.0379
5.3 Performance evaluation using the proposed latent space metrics
We calculated the values of the proposed latent space performance metrics for all aforementioned classifiers. The
corresponding results are provided in Table 3 and Fig. 3. We start interpreting these results from LGA and LRA,
which can be regarded as quality measures of generation and reconstruction capabilities of generative models. For
CelebA and LSUN, in Fig. 3, plots 1 and 4, it is visible that clean accuracy is correlated with both LGA and LRA. The
stronger correlation of LRA and clean accuracy can be explained by better reconstruction capabilities of our PIONEER
models compared to their generation capabilities. On MNIST, the associations of clean accuracy with LGA and LRA
are roughly the same (Pearson’s r = 0.5). Based on these observations, we conclude that the used generative models
are suitable for evaluation of other proposed metrics.
Next, we comment on LLNA, which is a local metric, unlike the others. We computed its values on particular images
and show several noise-based perturbations used in these computations in Fig. 4. Noise addition appeared to be a very
sample-inefficient adversary, but the values of LLNA can be treated as prediction stability measures. For example, for
the reconstructed image in the top right row of Fig. 4, the prediction of NNR is incorrect, and this also reflects in low
accuracy of perturbed images (e.g., for  = 0.5, the LNNA on this image is 82.5%). The same image is also somewhat
difficult for NR (for  = 0.5, LLNA = 92.0%).
The following findings are related to metrics that evaluate adversarial robustness in latent spaces:
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1. We found association between clean accuracy and latent adversarial robustness measured as LAGS,
LAGA, LARS, and LARA—see Fig. 3, plots 2–3 and 5–6. In addition, distribution plots of approximately
minimum perturbations found with PGD that were used in computing LAGS and LARS are given in Fig. A.4.
For LARS, examples of such perturbations are shown in Fig. 5, A.2 and A.3. This finding implies that latent
space perturbations may be valuable in training ANN classifiers further.
2. As visible from Fig. 5, A.2, and A.3, latent adversarial perturbations are surprisingly small on CelebA
and LSUN, which indicates that our proposed PGD-based untargeted attack is successful. At the same time,
generated images require smaller latent space perturbations—this can be explained by lower quality of gener-
ated images, which makes classifiers less confident in their initial predictions. On the other hand, on MNIST,
perturbations are very large (Fig. A.4, two topmost plots in the first column), significantly raise the norm of
the perturbed vector (Fig. A.4, two topmost plots in the second column) and thus exploit the part of the latent
space where the generative models were not trained to work. This can be explained by the simplicity of the
MNIST classification problem.
3. On CelebA and LSUN, we found no association, or even negative association between the conventional ad-
versarial robustness of the classifiers (measured with adversarial severity) and latent adversarial robustness
(measured with LAGS, LAGA, LARS and LAGA)—the corresponding plots are given in Fig. 3, plots 8–9
and 11–12. The outcome of this finding is that latent space performance metrics are different from conven-
tional ones. This finding is explainable given the association reported in point 1 above and robust classifiers
(NR and NB) being worse than non-robust ones (NNR and NCA) in terms of clean accuracy. On the other
hand, conventional and latent adversarial robustness are correlated on MNIST.
4. On CelebA and LSUN, the conventional robustness of the classifiers is visible in a different sense: although
approximately minimum latent adversarial perturbations for robust classifiers are not larger than the ones
for non-robust classifiers in terms of ‖·‖s2 in latent spaces, the former correspond to larger image changes
measured with `1 and `2 norms in the original space. This finding is visible in Fig. A.4, columns 3 and 4.
Larger values of `1 and `2 norms also imply larger perceptual differences.
Finally, we confirmed the meaning of decay in the latent space as a countermeasure against the increase of the norm of
the latent vector by the adversary: as visible from Fig. A.4, column 2, perturbed vectors typically exceed unperturbed
vectors by norm. This phenomenon is explained by (1) the lower probability density of vectors with large latent
space norms and the associated lack of classifier training on such less plausible input images, and (2) a higher ease to
exploit a weakness of a generative model with the same sort of vectors. In particular, the second explanation applies
to CelebA, where roughly half of approximately minimum latent space perturbations found with  = 0.5 (d = 0.106)
contained visual artifacts, even though the likelihood of perturbed images in DiL was actually higher than the one of
unperturbed images. With  = 1 (d = 0.293), the visual quality of perturbed images was higher. On the other hand,
on all datasets, even with  = 1 (d = 0.293), decayed images were visually close to the originals (this is visible on
Fig. 5, A.2, and A.3, columns 2–4).
5.4 Threats to validity
Below, we list the identified threats to the validity of our study and comment on them:
1. We worked with CNN classifiers of small size (circa 300 thousand trainable parameters), recognizing a small
number of classes and with a rather traditional architecture—it may appear that state-of-the-art classifiers,
such as the ones for ImageNet, have different patterns of latent space performance metric values. Yet, we
have checked that (1) for the classifiers that we have studied, a connection between adversarial robustness
and noise corruption robustness [13] exists, (2) on MNIST and CelebA, our robust classifiers have limited
capabilities of image generation [37]. On LSUN, we have seen that optimizing class activation of robust
classifiers adds qualitatively different features to the image compared to non-robust classifiers, but we have
not recognized the resulting images as bedrooms nor outdoors.
2. As we measure latent space adversarial robustness (LAGS, LARS, LAGA, LARA) with imprecise attack
approaches, we overestimate the values of these metrics. This bias might have resulted in our classifiers
ranked wrongly according to the computed values. PGD was shown to work well in the original space [31],
but there is so far no similar set of experiments that confirm this property in latent spaces. We used PGD with
12 restarts to compensate for the possibility of such a bias. In certain cases (search of minimum adversarial
perturbations on CelebA and LSUN), we used a single PGD run with a smaller learning rate, but in these
cases, we had ensured that such runs differ insignificantly from the ones of PGD with restarts in terms of the
resulting metric values.
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Table 3: Latent space performance metrics of considered CNN classifiers. Accuracy and adversarial robustness com-
putations were performed with 10000 and 600 images respectively. LARA was measured with ρ = 0.3 on MNIST
and ρ = 0.1 on CelebA and LSUN. For each value series, the best (largest) value is shown in bold.
Classifier
Accuracy  = 0.5 (d = 0.106)  = 1.0 (d = 0.293)
LGA LRA LAGS LARS LAGA LARA LAGS LARS LAGA LARA
MNIST
NUT 97.7% 98.8% 0.3026 0.3061 37.7% 33.8% 0.3117 0.3465 38.3% 41.3%
NNR 98.4% 99.1% 0.3264 0.3300 42.7% 41.7% 0.3394 0.3613 50.2% 49.3%
NCA 98.5% 98.6% 0.3414 0.3373 46.2% 43.2% 0.3505 0.3728 44.8% 50.3%
NR 98.1% 98.9% 0.3385 0.3316 44.0% 40.8% 0.3533 0.3628 47.2% 45.5%
NB 98.2% 98.9% 0.3510 0.3385 42.3% 41.3% 0.3404 0.3666 42.0% 45.3%
CelebA
NUT 95.9% 96.0% 0.0582 0.0801 11.0% 22.7% 0.0564 0.0757 8.3% 16.2%
NNR 98.2% 98.4% 0.0685 0.0972 14.7% 32.8% 0.0680 0.0907 9.3% 25.7%
NCA 97.5% 97.5% 0.0661 0.0914 16.0% 30.5% 0.0633 0.0845 9.3% 22.0%
NR 97.1% 97.0% 0.0642 0.0957 10.7% 31.5% 0.0629 0.0837 5.8% 22.8%
NB 94.9% 94.4% 0.0555 0.0828 7.7% 24.3% 0.0537 0.0739 4.0% 15.7%
LSUN
NUT 97.3% 93.7% 0.0493 0.0794 21.2% 36.3% 0.0477 0.0682 23.2% 31.8%
NNR 98.9% 96.8% 0.0619 0.1062 24.3% 47.3% 0.0566 0.0952 19.0% 40.2%
NCA 99.0% 97.3% 0.0665 0.1037 23.5% 43.5% 0.0633 0.0947 22.5% 35.7%
NR 97.5% 92.1% 0.0588 0.0976 5.2% 36.7% 0.0532 0.0841 5.0% 23.7%
NB 97.1% 93.3% 0.0637 0.1017 10.5% 40.2% 0.0636 0.0904 11.3% 26.7%
3. On LSUN, the small size of the validation set (600 images) may have resulted in prematurely early stopping
of training and imprecise accuracy estimates. In addition, the corresponding generative models produced
random images with visible flaws. Yet, our observations for this dataset are not very different from the ones
for CelebA, and perfect generative models might be hard to achieve on custom datasets.
4. PIONEER (CelebA and LSUN) models are designed to be trained to generate images from normalized la-
tent vectors, and the latent distribution is actually the uniform distribution on the unit sphere instead of the
Gaussian. In this paper, this has led to all reconstructed and generated images having unit scaled norm.
Nonetheless, the decoder was capable of accepting unnormalized latent vectors, and decay still worked in-
tuitively, i.e., by softening prominent features of images. This effect might have been caused by N(0, I)
and the uniform distribution on the unit sphere being very similar in multidimensional spaces: `2 norms of
high-dimensional standard Gaussians are concentrated around
√
nL.
6 Related work
6.1 Adversarial examples in latent spaces
A number of works used generative models to create adversarial attacks and/or defenses. The work [47] proposed
an approach to search adversarial examples in the latent space of a GAN, also measuring them with `2 norms. This
approach is white-box and is based on directed sampling rather than gradient descent, which makes it applicable to
discrete input data, such as in natural language processing tasks. By contrast, our techniques operate in a black-
box setting and only with feed-forward ANNs accepting continuous data. Nonetheless, (1) being based on gradient
descent, our latent perturbation search approach is able to find perceptually smaller perturbations (compared to the
ones presented in [47]), (2) we consider a more general framework of transforming data to the latent space and back,
(3) we connect latent adversarial robustness to a “natural” model of noise in the latent space and this way motivate
the use of the `2 norm, (4) we search adversarial examples for larger classification tasks (128× 128 images compared
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Figure 3: Correlation plots for some of the data presented in Table 3 (plots 1–6, 8–9, 11–12) and additional data (plots
7 and 10). Plots are made for CelebA (blue crosses) and LSUN (orange circles) data combined (MNIST data is not
shown). Plots 1 and 4 show the relation between clean accuracy, LRA and LGA. Plots 2–3 and 5–6 show an association
between clean accuracy and latent adversarial robustness (measured as LAGS, LAGA, LARS, LARA). Plots 7 and 10
show an association between conventional adversarial robustness (measured as adversarial severity with respect to
perturbations bounded by scaled `2 norm) and the averaged scaled `2 norm of found approximately minimum latent
perturbations. Plots 8–9 and 11–12 demonstrate the absence of positive association between conventional adversarial
robustness and latent adversarial robustness. For each plot, Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients (r and
ρ, respectively) are given.
to 64 × 64 in [47]) and latent spaces (511 dimensions compared to 128 in [47]), and (5) we focus on computing
performance metrics for classifiers and not on finding adversarial examples per se.
In [40], latent space adversarial examples were created from scratch. This was done using a class-conditional AC-
GAN, and evaluation was in particular done on the CelebA (gender classification) and MNIST datasets. We also
search for adversarial examples based on generated data items, however, (1) again, we do it for images larger than
64× 64, (2) we consider the untargeted attack scenario and use a different approach to generate adversarial examples,
(3) our approach is not restricted to AC-GANs, and (4) we focus on computing performance metrics rather than finding
adversarial examples.
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Figure 4: Examples of perturbations for CelebA and LSUN images of each class (left: “female”, “bedroom”, right:
“male”, “church outdoor”) that were generated as latent Gaussian noise. In each image sequence: the original image,
the image reconstructed by PIONEER ( = 0), then four perturbed reconstructed images with increasing noise mag-
nitudes  = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0. Green labels show classification outcomes of NNR (on the first line) and NR (on the
second line). All images in this figure have resolution 128×128.
Reconstruction Decay Perturbation for NNR Perturbation for NR
x x0 x1 ∆x x
′
NR ∆xNR x
′
R ∆xR
Figure 5: Examples of approximately minimum latent CelebA and LSUN image perturbations with  = 1 (d = 0.293),
each found with a single run of PGD from ∆l = 0, for classifiers NNR and NR. In each row, images are given in the
following order: x, the real image (with classification outcomes of NNR and NR shown in green); x0 = Di(l0), the
reconstructed image (with both classification outcomes); x1 = Di(l1), the decayed image (with both classification
outcomes); ∆x = x1−x0, the difference between two previous images; x′NR = Di(l′NR), the perturbed image forNNR
(with the classification outcome of NNR); ∆xNR = x′NR − x1, the perturbation for NNR; x′R = Di(l′R), the perturbed
image for NR (with the classification outcome of NR); ∆xR = x′R − x1, the perturbation for NR. All images in this
figure have resolution 128×128.
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Generative models were used as defenses against adversarial attacks [36, 39]. For example, the Defense-GAN [36]
approach protects image classifiers from adversarial attacks by replacing their input with an approximation in the latent
space of a GAN (similarly to what is done when computing LRA in our work). This defense was broken in [26] with
an optimization procedure in the latent space subject to a norm constraint in the original space. Our results are in line
with this work, since we similarly approximate input images using a latent space of a generative model, and are able to
find perceptually small perturbations that change the prediction of the classifier. The same work [26] also proposed a
defense approach based on the search of pairs of examples that are close in the latent space but are scored completely
differently by the classifier, and subsequent augmentation of robust optimization with training on these pairs.
6.2 Robustness metrics for ANNs and their evaluation
Usually robustness of ANNs to adversarial attacks is measured relatively to a specific attack success. The work [45]
proposes an improvement over the default accuracy-based approach. By analyzing the decision surfaces of models,
the authors note that robust models have smooth decision boundaries. The proposed metric reflects this by rewarding
models with smooth decision surfaces.
The first paper to formalize the notion of adversarial robustness was [5], where the authors propose several metrics
quantifying the network robustness, namely, pointwise robustness, adversarial frequency and adversarial severity (see
Section 2.4). The authors compute the latter two through pointwise robustness, which is measured by approximation.
Exact pointwise robustness calculations are performed in [7], although the authors refer to the measure as to the “lower
bound on the image distortion.” Also, the notion of pointwise robustness is explored in [12], where the authors derive
theoretical upper bounds for it. Authors in [44] propose an effective proxy measure of network robustness based
on measuring Lipschitz constants, although it has received some criticism [16]. An alternative method to quantifying
global robustness properties of networks is proposed by the authors of [18]. The authors develop a clustering algorithm
that outputs a set of verified regions—a collection of hyperspheres where the network is guaranteed to produce the
same label.
7 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we presented a framework to evaluate the performance of feed-forward ANN classifiers with the help
of generative models. Within the framework, we proposed several performance metrics, the most interesting of which
are related to measuring the robustness of classifiers to perturbations in latent spaces of these generative models. In
addition, we presented techniques to evaluate these metrics for classifiers, including a novel PGD-based untargeted
attack. The main motivation of our work is the property of generative models of mimicking the data distribution. This
property implies that the adversarial perturbations that we consider result in natural data changes.
The proposed metrics allowed us to make several interesting observations regarding deep ANN classifiers. We com-
puted the values of these metrics on several CNN image classifiers and found an association between the accuracy of
the classifiers on clean images and adversarial robustness in latent spaces. This implies that latent adversarial examples
might be useful for further classifier training. We also found that conventional adversarial robustness does not have a
strong impact on its latent counterparts, but it is still reflected in the norms of latent adversarial perturbations in the
original space.
A speculative explanation of the found connection between the accuracy and latent adversarial robustness is that the
latter measures the vulnerability of the classifier to natural adversarial examples, while the accuracy measures the same
for random natural examples. A similar interdependence of accuracy and robustness to natural adversarial examples
of a different kind was experimentally found in [19]. An alternative explanation is based on the work [13], where a
connection was shown between conventional adversarial robustness and robustness to corruption with Gaussian noise.
When we move to latent spaces, the former becomes LARS/LARA, and the latter becomes the averaged version of
LLNA, which, due to our noise model, is just LRA. In turn, for a generative model with good reconstruction quality,
LRA is highly associated with accuracy. The finding of the work [13] is exact for linear models and was shown to
hold on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet nonlinear classifiers. In our case, we can imagine that the classifier accepts latent
representations of class i, and is actually a composition of Di and the original classifier N . Unfortunately, the same
properties were not confirmed to hold for classifiers of this kind, and hence this explanation is speculative as well.
The majority of the proposed metrics relies on the choices of latent distributions as Gaussians and the correspond-
ing Gaussian noise model for this distribution (Eq. 1) that together (1) make the noise preserve the distributions of
unperturbed vectors DiL and (2) result in simple likelihood bounds as `2 norms. The choice of Gaussians is very
conventional, and there is at least one different possible choice: consider the uniform distribution on the unit sphere
and the noise model that adds a random Gaussian vector and then normalizes the resulting vector to unit norm. This
16
solution would still result in `2 vector distances monotonically corresponding to noise likelihood. Some other choices
would not achieve both properties (1) and (2). For example, a Gamma-distributed latent vector would sum with a
Gamma-distributed noise vector and still remain Gamma-distributed, but the likelihood of such vectors is more diffi-
cult. Conversely, taking Laplace distributions would result in `1 norm likelihood bounds, but summing the unperturbed
vector and the noise would not preserve the distribution family.
In the future, we plan to work in the following directions:
• Check experimentally whether the findings of the work [13] are also satisfied in latent spaces—this would
further clarify the relationship between the accuracy and latent adversarial robustness.
• Perform robust manifold defense [26] or other form of training with latent adversarial examples, and explore
the impact of this training on the values of performance metrics.
• The proposed metrics to measure latent space adversarial robustness (LAGS, LARS, LAGA, LARA) can be
treated as specifications for ANN classifiers, given a threshold on their values to be satisfied. Gradient-based
approaches of checking them are imprecise, and verification of even simpler ANN properties was proven
to be NP-hard [27]. A precise, but more computationally intensive way of checking ANN specifications is
formal verification [3, 10, 24, 27, 28, 35, 38].
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A Appendix: additional figures
MNIST, reconstructed (one image per class; each original image is followed by its reconstruction):
MNIST, generated (two images per class):
CelebA (classes “female” and “male”), reconstructed:
CelebA (classes “female” and “male”), generated:
LSUN (classes “bedroom” and “church outdoor”), reconstructed:
LSUN (classes “bedroom” and “church outdoor”), generated:
Figure A.1: Examples of images reconstructed and generated by considered generative models. All CelebA and LSUN
images in this figure and other images produced by PIONEER in the figures below have resolution 128×128.
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Reconstruction Decay Perturbation for NNR Perturbation for NR
x x0 x1 ∆x x
′
NR ∆xNR x
′
R ∆xR
Figure A.2: Additional examples of approximately minimum latent CelebA image perturbations with  = 1 (d =
0.293). Images are arranged as in Fig. 5.
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Reconstruction Decay Perturbation for NNR Perturbation for NR
x x0 x1 ∆x x
′
NR ∆xNR x
′
R ∆xR
Figure A.3: Additional examples of approximately minimum latent LSUN image perturbations with  = 1 (d =
0.293). Images are arranged as in Fig. 5.
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Figure A.4: Distribution plots (with Gaussian kernel density estimation) with statistics on approximately minimum
latent image perturbations with  = 1 (d = 0.293) found by PGD (600 images for each row of plots). l is the decayed
latent vector, ∆l is the found perturbation, and ∆x is the change of the original image as a vector of pixel intensities.
Colors correspond to classifiers as follows: NUT is blue, NNR is orange, NCA is green, NR is red, NB is purple.
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B Appendix: classifier training procedure
All classifiers listed in Section 5.1 were trained as follows. As the basis for their architecture, we used the script
https://github.com/keras-team/keras/blob/master/examples/cifar10_cnn.py. Essentially, this is a
simple CNN architecture composed of convolutional blocks, ReLU nonlinearities, batch normalization, max-pooling,
dropout, and a fully connected layer with softmax on top. Training was done with RMSProp. In each epoch, we
took 100 thousand random images from the training set. The learning rate was set to 0.0004 and multiplied by 0.75
after each epoch. Training continued for up to 8 epochs, but was stopped prematurely if validation accuracy had not
increased during the previous epoch. The following was specific to different classifier types:
1. NUT: No data augmentation was used. Training was stopped after one epoch.
2. NNR: No data augmentation was used. Training was done for the remaining 7 epochs starting from NUT.
3. NCA: Training images were augmented with conventional approaches: small affine transformations, color
distortions and erasures of small image parts.
4. NR: Training images were augmented with Gaussian noise of magnitude σ = 0.8 (pixel intensities belong to
[−1, 1]). Note that this is different from the work [13], where for each image first σ was selected uniformly
at random and then noise was added. Training was started from NNR.
5. NB: Training images were first augmented conventionally (as in the case of NCA), and then with Gaussian
noise (as in the case of NR). Training was started from NCA.
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